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The Impersonal Is Political: Spinoza and
a Feminist Politics of Imperceptibility
HASANA SHARP
This essay examines Elizabeth Grosz's provocative claim that feminist and anti-racist
theorists should reject a politics of recognition in favor of "a politics of impercept-
ibility." She criticizes any humanist politics centered upon a dialectic between self and
other. I turn to Spinoza to develop and explore her alternative proposal. I claim that
Spinoza offers resources for her promising politics of corporeality, proximity, power,
and connection that includes all of nature, which feminists should explore.
In several places throughout her writings, Elizabeth Grosz urges feminist and
post-colonial theorists to think beyond the "regime of recognition," which, she
contends, cannot escape an investment in a humanistic politics of identity
(Grosz 2002, 2005). Rather than mobilize for visibility, intersubjective
affirmation, and cross-cultural and mutual understanding, she advocates "a
politics of imperceptibility" grounded in an inhuman ontology of forces. In this
paper, I will outline some of the problems Grosz identifies with a politics of
recognition and explore her somewhat surprising exhortation to "impercept-
ibility" and "impersonality." I propose that Grosz's idiom of force, nature, and
impersonality is grounded in an effort to produce a political vocabulary entirely
alien to humanism. I understand humanism in politics to include any vision of
justice that is grounded in a special feature of existence that is not exhibited by
non-human beings but is held to be universally shared by humans. Thus, any
politics grounded in the recognition of shared rationality, the universal ability
to formulate one's life plan or vision of the good, or the capacity to assume
reciprocal obligations would be included. Grosz is not concerned, however,
with any and all political theory, but specifically with feminist and anti-racist
thought. A number of feminist and anti-racist theorists have often found the
politics of recognition to be more congenial than either liberal individualism,
which disavows the constitutive role of relationships and radical human
dependency in shaping autonomy and selfhood (see, for example, Kittay
1998), or an unmodified communitarianism, which lacks a sufficient analysis
of power relationships internal to communities (Frazer and Lacey 1993). Many
feminists have been attracted to the emphasis in the politics of recognition
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upon the arduous and delicate intersubjective processes of establishing rela-
tionships of respect, equality, and sympathy among people with distinct
languages, cultures, histories, and perspectives. Likewise, such theorists
appreciate that the politics of recognition treats the profound damage that
can be caused by oppressive socio-symbolic regimes, which cannot be captured
by a theory that focuses exclusively on the just distribution of goods, or on the
rights owed to individuals. Without dismissing the genuine concerns of these
feminist and anti-racist thinkers, Grosz rejects the politics of recognition on
the grounds that the desire to be known, seen, and valued by the other is an
inevitably submissive acquiescence to a humanism that can never fail to be
masculine.
In an effort to imagine what her alternative "politics of imperceptibility"
might entail, I turn to Spinoza's critique of anthropocentrism as a disabling
feature of human imagination. In support of Grosz's suggestive remarks,
Spinoza's philosophy reveals how a non-humanist theory might actually better
address some of the needs identified by a politics of recognition. In particular, I
offer an interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy precisely as a remedy for the
genuine psychic and corporeal damage provoked by, for example, misogyny
and cultural imperialism, to which the politics of recognition rightly aims to
respond. Spinoza's alternative, moreover, intersects with Grosz's call for a
positive and experimental politics animated by a desire for joyful affects and the
enhancement of bodily pleasures, practices, and powers. I aim to show both
that Spinoza's philosophy offers an alternative analysis and remedy for the sad
affects that are traditionally understood to follow from misrecognition and that
it generates alternative affective criteria for measuring the successes and failures
of political practice. While I do not argue that Spinoza's politics are equivalent
to Grosz's politics of imperceptibility, I outline how Spinoza's thought offers
further resources for the development of a promising politics of corporeality,
proximity, and connection beyond and in excess of the human.
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION
The politics of recognition has come under suspicion by several thinkers
recently (Oliver 2001; Markell 2003), even as it arguably remains a
predominant way of conceiving political struggle in North American and
western European multicultural democracies. No doubt, many are familiar with
the debates about whether the terrain of politics has shifted entirely toward
recognition and away from redistribution (Fraser 1995), but the various parties
generally concede Charles Taylor's claim that recognition comprises "a vital
human need" and that the misrecognition of identities is an appropriate way of
understanding oppression and injustice in late capitalism. Present-day theories
of recognition are diverse and often vague as to what precisely the desire for
recognition is, what aspect of the self or group requires and is owed recognition,
by whom, and toward what end. Moreover, as Patchen Markell has pointed
85Hasana Sharp
out, it is often unclear whether the politics of recognition aims to recognize
the already existing truths of intact identities, or whether the dynamics of
recognition are meant to bring into being and enable the very subjectivities
(identities) to whom recognition is due. In other words, Markell asks whether
the politics of recognition is meant to know or to make social subjects (Markell
2000, 496). Of course, the Hegelian paradigm allows doing and knowing to be
understood as dynamic, co-constitutive processes, yet the metaphysical and
epistemological tension between becoming and recognizing may suggest that
the satisfaction of a desire for recognition is an awkward yardstick for justice. In
other words, if the construction of individual and group identity is an ongoing,
responsive, and intersubjective process, how can moral demands for recogni-
tion be completed?
Although many ambiguities remain constitutive of a politics of recognition,
one can nevertheless identify its fundamental animating principles.
Most basically, theories of recognition aim to replace the monadic model of
liberal individualism with a dyadic or intersubjective model of social
subjectivity derived from Hegel's famous master-slave dialectic. Theorists
in this neo-Hegelian tradition aim to construct moral and political theories
that treat freedom as an achievement that depends upon social relationships
and institutional conditions conducive to the development of "an
intact identity" and a positive relationship to oneself (Honneth and Fraser
2003). Moreover, the framework of recognition develops a radically social
understanding of human psychology, which entails attention to the less
measurable forms of injustice inflicted by, for example, pervasive symbolic
depreciation of particular social identities. That is, the politics of recognition
takes account of how systematic social invisibility, misrepresentation, or
distortion constitute a genuine harm-indeed, in extreme cases, psychic
mutilation-to the autonomy of individuals and groups. As most theorists
would be willing to acknowledge, the damage produced by histories of
conquest, genocide, slavery, colonialism, cultural and linguistic imperialism,
and millennia of patriarchy is not healed by formal equality, greater access to
jobs, housing, and social services alone. In the words of Charles Taylor,"misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous
wound, saddling its victims with crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not
just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need" (Taylor 1992, 26).
Whether and how this vital need is met through political practice and
institutions animates many debates and divisions within political thought
today.
It is far beyond the scope of this paper and Elizabeth Grosz's project to
address these debates as a whole. Grosz addresses her critique of recognition and
her exhortation to think otherwise specifically to feminist and post-colonial
thinkers. Thus, she targets those who write as or on behalf of the oppressed and
misrecognized, those who may be, according to Taylor, enduring "grievous
wound[s]" and suffering "crippling self-hatred." In particular, Grosz responds to
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an essay co-authored by Drucilla Cornell and Sara Murphy as well as to the
influential work of Judith Butler, whose recent writings frequently invoke a
political understanding of recognition. Grosz clearly engages these particular
theorists by virtue of sympathy for their overall political impulses and a shared
desire to fight racism and sexism. Yet she urges those who understand
themselves to be either misrecognized, or writing on behalf of the misrecog-
nized, to reject both the model of recognition and the intersubjective dynamic
it presupposes. She makes what may be a startling suggestion that feminists and
post-colonial thinkers forget about "the Other" and affirm the irrepressibly
agonistic dynamics of nature and bodily forces. It is to her suggestive critique
that I now turn.
GROSZ'S CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION
Grosz's call for a politics of imperceptibility first appears in a critical response to
an essay by Cornell and Murphy, "Anti-racism, Multiculturalism, and an
Ethics of Identification" (Cornell and Murphy 2002). In her response, Grosz
applauds Cornell and Murphy for endeavoring to re-formulate a politics of
recognition that is not tied to the acknowledgment of an authentic, pre-
political, conscious cultural identity, which is a model they attribute to Charles
Taylor. Cornell and Murphy aim to decouple the struggle for recognition from
any notion of "authenticity," while advocating an "ethics of identification."
The notion of authenticity derived from Herder and Trilling presupposes that
we are all equally human, but each in our own irreducibly unique way. Even as
Taylor, with Hegel, insists that we become who we truly are, in our singularity,
only by virtue of our relationships with others, Cornell and Murphy contend
that the affirmation of others as "authentic" entails an unacceptably static
notion of personal and cultural identity (420, 444). Moreover, authenticity
risks the eclipse of the need to recognize individuals as the sources of the
meanings of their identities, meanings that are continually being revised and
reinterpreted (421). Instead, they advocate an "ethics of identification," which
implies an ongoing transformative practice among diverse social actors and
allows for the emergence of incipient, novel identities. They claim that
emphasis should be placed upon the freedom to recreate oneself through the
assertion and recognition of one another's humanity. The basis of such a
politics should be the dignity and respect owed to all human beings, which
entails attention to each person's potential and need to develop and transform
her self-representation and cultural meaning. Cornell and Murphy advocate
the (state) provision of "the psychic and moral space" in which the oppressed
are as able as anyone else to intervene in and shape how they are seen through
participation in public discourse, art, and literature.
1
Although Grosz appreciates the move away from a narrow politics
of identity conceived in terms of authenticity, in which the oppressed struggle
to be seen for who they really are, she remains highly critical of any language
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of recognition. Ultimately, she fears that any vision of justice predicated
upon the validation of social subjects by other subjects belongs to "a politics
that is fundamentally servile." Grosz acknowledges that minorities seek
recognition from each other and not necessarily from the dominant culture,
but she advocates a far more radical rejection of any conception of the self
that is "governed, in advance, by the image and value of the other," no matter
who that other happens to be (Grosz 2002, 471). In a different discussion
of the same essay, Grosz advocates a turn to a Nietzschean conception of the
subject precisely because it is wholly "indifferent to the other" (Grosz 2005,
86). She urges her readers to think instead about politics in terms of agonistic
forces, impersonal and trans-human becomings, and unmasterable and
uncognizable struggle (Grosz 2002, 469). She calls for the politics of
recognition and identity to be supplanted by a fight for "bodily activities and
practices" (Grosz 2005, 87).
Needless to say, Grosz's is far from a typical feminist critique of Hegelian and
neo-Hegelian theories of intersubjectivity and recognition. Kelly Oliver, for
example, endeavors to go "beyond recognition" on the grounds that sub-
jectivity need not be considered in terms of violence and antagonism, as it is in
Hegel, Sartre, or Butler (Oliver 2001). Oliver objects to a flattening account of
any and all social subjectivity on the model of trauma and a portrait of all
otherness in the image of threat and hostility. She argues, persuasively in my
view, that such a universal account elides the real differences between coming
to be a social subject under conditions of radical oppression and coming to be
a subject in a context of privilege. Oliver endeavors to construct an alternative
account of collective and dyadic intersubjectivity that neither presupposes
violence nor covers over distinctively oppressive histories. Thus, her theory
aims to respond and bear witness to the profound sufferings of particular others.
At the same time, Oliver's theory supports the feminist vision of a just world in
which social subjects might come to be in a context of responsiveness,
attentive connection, and love.
Like Oliver, the vast majority of feminist theorists remain focused on ethical
practices of attuning oneself better to others, especially the disadvantaged.
They tend to promote political strategies that modify and refine symbolic
representation, social meaning, and communicative interaction. For example,
Oliver advocates an alternative notion of vision in terms of sensual con-
nectivity, counter to the speculative tradition in the history of philosophy.
Without revising the very notion of visual apprehension, Cornell and Murphy
insist upon the right to participate actively in one's own social representations.
In one way or another, a number of feminist theorists advocate seeing better,
conceiving others more appropriately, and becoming better able to perceive
differences in subjective experiences (compare Alcoff 2005). At the same time,
many acknowledge in a Levinasian vein that an ideal of mutual transparency is
neither possible nor desirable. Yet one is still called upon to become ever more
critical, ever more sensitive to one's failure to see, conceive, or grasp the needs,
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desires, and experiences of other subjects. Even as a traditional model of
transparent, mutual recognition is soundly rejected,2 the desire to see, perceive,
and imagine better remains an animating ethical and political impulse in
feminist and anti-racist theory.
Grosz, in stark contrast, does not advocate a theory of social subjectivity that
is either less agonistic or more responsive to particular others and their
histories. Her Nietzschean paradigm of impersonal, a-subjective forces renders
violence and conflict both necessary and irresolvable. Grosz advocates a
politics of imperceptibility precisely because it privileges acts, forces, energies,
and bodies. Such a paradigm utterly rejects a dialectic of self and other, since,
she notes, "acts don't have an 'other.' Only Subjects have an 'other"' (Found
Objects Collective, 2007, 4). In advocating imperceptibility, she clearly
opposes a project of mutual clarification and disclosure. Rather, she urges her
readers to join her in a political project that embraces opacity, dissolution,
indiscernibility, and de-particularization.
What motivates Grosz's somewhat strange exhortation to imperceptibility?
To whom might it be attractive? When one examines her inspiration for a
politics of imperceptibility, her counter-program might appear even more
perplexing. Grosz appropriates the notion of imperceptibility (without cita-
tion) from Deleuze's and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus. The notion of
becoming-imperceptible appears at the extreme end of a spectrum of
"becoming-animal." Deleuze and Guattari propose becoming-animal as a
notion of becoming that is not predicated on identification, imitation,
resemblance, or analogy. Rather than the reflection of an unconscious urge to
work out a psychic identification with a lost other-be it a parent, love-object,
or part of oneself-becomings-animal are impersonal and unmasterable
communications among and between bodily forces that cannot be represented
by concepts or explained through developmental narratives. If I represent
myself as feeling "like a banana slug," it may be the way I contain and imagine
the destabilizing effect of a molecular exchange between the porous and
dynamic assemblage I call "my body" and that of the myriad inhuman bodies
upon which I depend and with which I cannot but coexist. Becomings-animal,
according to Deleuze and Guattari, occur on a continuum that begins, on the
one side, with what they call the "special introductory power" of becoming-
woman and culminates, "at the far side," in becoming-imperceptible (1987,
248).
In an earlier work, Grosz assesses the conceptual apparatus of A Thousand
Plateaus and finds precisely Deleuze and Guattari's affirmation of becoming-
woman as a portal to becoming-imperceptible to be distasteful.
But there must remain a wariness, insofar as they too sever
becoming-woman from being-woman, and make the specifi-
cities of becoming-woman crucial to men's quest for self-
expansion. They render women's becomings, their subversions,
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their minoritarian and marginal struggles subordinate to a
cosmic becoming-imperceptible which amounts, in effect, to a
political obliteration or marginalization of women's struggles.
(Grosz 1993, 179)
Today, however, she urges precisely feminists and post-colonial theorists to
embrace what once appeared to her as a mystical "obliteration" of the
demands, desires, and projects of women. Perhaps the link between becom-
ing-imperceptible and becoming-woman as part of the project of becoming-
animal is what prevents Grosz from noting that a politics of imperceptibility is
conceptually inherited from Deleuze and Guattari. Yet insofar as the project
of becoming-animal, -woman, -child, and -imperceptible belongs to a program
of radical anti-humanism in Deleuze and Guattari, its lineage is essential to her
critiques of Cornell and Murphy as well as of Butler.
Cornell and Murphy preserve the language of recognition in part to affirm
the necessity of contesting and opening up the symbolic content of the term
"human." Likewise, Butler claims in Undoing Gender that her project neces-
sarily begins and ends with "the human" (Butler 2004, 17). Butler's recent
work explicitly belongs to what she calls a "post-Hegelian politics of recogni-
tion," which comprises an effort to destabilize and expand the designation of
humanity in response to implicitly socially sanctioned violence against
unrecognizable others (for example, Butler 2005). Grosz consistently exhibits
suspicion, however, of any discourse of the human. Although Nietzsche is often
invoked to support her emphasis upon the inhuman, her motivation is at least
equally inspired by Irigaray's critique of the univocal and phallocentric logic of
Western thought. When she defends her preference for a language of forces
rather than subjects, she notes that feminists are likely to consider an idiom of
force, power, and action to be masculine and patriarchal. "But this maneuver of
identifying force with the masculine is already to humanize force (which in
effect is to masculinize it, in a phallocentric logos), to anthropomorphize it and
to refuse to see its role not as the effect but as the condition of subjectivity and
subjective will" (Grosz 2005, 187). Thus, in this parenthetical identification of
humanization with masculinization, one can detect her motivation for the
language of force as proper to a politics of imperceptibility. Because, for Grosz,
any and all humanization and anthropomorphism falls into a phallocentric
economy of the same, she rejects the possibility of expanding and stretching
the category of the human to include its excluded others. Although many
feminists affirm that "the human" is always already masculine, most do not see
any alternative to an appeal to this particular universal, especially if they are
writing something like programmatic political theory. Yet Grosz remains in a
programmatic hortatory mode where, instead of modifying and endeavoring
genuinely to universalize a single overarching term, she promotes a turn to the
inhuman, to the multiplicity and disunity of natural and bodily forces, to the
non-discursive, non-representable terrain of actions, affects, and becomings.
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Although Grosz does not condemn any and all humanist political theories tout
court, she claims that feminist and anti-racist struggle is starved for new
languages, new concepts, and new problems (Grosz 2002, 463). Perhaps only
a radical attempt to exit the regime of recognition and its corresponding desire
for visibility and intersubjective affirmation can yield a new horizon for
thought and action?
THINKING BEYOND THE (Hu)MAN
One of the distinctive aspects of Grosz's counter-proposal it that she seems
to call for a more primitive and naturalistic language rather than a more
sophisticated, more adequate conceptualization of our increasingly diverse
world. She invokes Nietzsche's familiar critique of the subject as a "productive
and activating fiction" (Grosz 2002, 466) and invites us to think instead about
forces, energies, and acts below and above the level of the human. Since most
feminists who appropriate the Hegelian intersubjective model are nevertheless
unable to accept it in its entirety, she reasons that they ought "to begin with
different working assumptions," assumptions that do not depend upon a
particular response from another, a receptive audience, or even the articulate
demands of conscious agents. As Linda Alcoff points out, many women and
racial minorities do not experience their identities and social positions as
oppressive, damaging, or painful (Alcoff 2005). The politics of recognition
speaks especially to those who suffer misrecognition and felt psychological
oppression, what Taylor refers to as "crippling self-hatred." Given the diversity
of psychologies and lived experiences of social identities, might there be an
important place for a politics grounded in a set of positive demands and
aspirations rather than the negative exigencies of redress, reparation, and
restitution? Perhaps we might be well served to galvanize political action
around an effort to expand, enhance, and proliferate corporeal desires,
pleasures, and activities? Although it would likely be cruel and foolish to
abandon political efforts in the realm of representation that aim to repair the
effects of genocide, slavery, and colonialism, a commitment to resist the gravest
forms of injustice need not entail the eclipse of other creative and affirmative
collective endeavors. Moreover, experiments in political thinking and practice
might supplement rather than threaten ongoing efforts to recover from
violence and to engender better ways of living in common.
Grosz makes an urgent call for "new intellectual resources" to address
domination (Grosz 2002, 463; emphasis in original). Toward that end, she
suggests that "[slubjects can be conceived as modes of action and passion, a
surface of catalytic events, events which subjects do not control but participate
in, which produce what history and thus what identity subjects may have"
(468). Rather than a "psychical interiority inhabited by the specter of the
other," she advocates a perspective in which "what marks the subject as such is
its capacity to act and be acted upon, to do rather than to be, to act rather than
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to identify" (466). Thus, she endeavors to address the same phenomena-
identity and social subjectivity-that preoccupy many feminists and anti-
racists today, but in an alternative idiom. Grosz claims that we are confronted
with "a theoretical choice" between what is ultimately a humanist, however
deconstructed, "theory of the subject" and what she calls an inhuman "theory
of impersonal," natural forces. Although she attributes this alternative
language and theoretical lens to Nietzsche, they might equally be predicated
of Spinoza.3 Spinoza's thoroughgoing challenge to anthropocentric thinking
can supplement the alternative, impersonal angle she proposes. Moreover,
compared with Nietzsche's philosophy, Spinoza's thought exhibits less suspi-
cion toward collective efforts to live and think joyfully and powerfully together,
and arguably has greater potential for the elaboration of a positive, feminist
agenda. Indeed, a number of feminists have recognized Spinoza's philosophy as
a rich resource (for example, Gatens 1996; Gatens and Lloyd 1999; Braidotti
2002). Nietzsche surely alerts modern subjects to our problematic assumptions,
habits, and investments with more rhetorical force than perhaps any other
philosopher. I would like to suggest, however, that Spinoza opens up still
further avenues for the practice of a politics of imperceptibility.
In support of Grosz's program as I interpret it, Spinoza's philosophy offers a
rubric of analysis that denies the radical uniqueness of human being with
respect to the rest of nature. Although Spinoza was writing well before
Hegelian theories of recognition and the politics entailed by it, his thinking
might be understood to resist a politics predicated on apprehending the unique
interiority of fellow subjects. Although Spinoza shares Hobbes's view that
human ambition and desire for esteem must be presupposed in the successful
organization of a state, this does not mean that collective well-being is best
served by aiming to satisfy such desires. That is, Spinoza's political writings, far
from according priority to individual or group recognition, provide strmctural
means to reorient such desires that might be educated and fulfilled in
alternative ways, according to the affective therapy described in the Ethics.4
Indeed, the appendix to the first part of the Ethics identifies the need to
be preferred and loved as an individual by God and one's fellows as a source
of both personal misery and human conflict. Similarly, the preface to the
Theological-Political Treatise criticizes religious groups for making themselves
recognizable primarily through superficial differences from other sects rather
than on the basis of a genuinely admirable strength of spirit or a capacious
ability to love other human beings (Spinoza 1998, 4). In other words, even as
Spinoza's psychology, in the Ethics as well as in the political writings, stresses a
desire to be enjoyed and admired by others, this psychological principle does
not necessarily lead to either a neo-Kantian or neo-Hegelian emphasis on the
respect and esteem owed to social subjects as central to a just political order. On
the contrary, in the best-case scenario, ambitio, the desire to please and be
esteemed by fellow human beings (E Illp29s), finds higher expression in the
gloria of a non-reciprocal intellectual love of God (E Vpl9, Vp36s).5 While the
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Ethics moves toward an impersonal identification with God, nature, and human
community, the political writings, in complementary but different ways,
likewise aim to redirect rather than satisfy interpersonal passions for esteem.
A full analysis of the vicissitudes of the desire for glory and esteem in
Spinoza requires a separate treatment, but for now, I will suggest that the
remedy for the desire for recognition is not the other's perception and
affirmation of one's claims and projects, and it is certainly not the fulfillment
of the desire to be desired. Rather, the remedy for the affect of ambitio must
include the displacement of the drive for that special kind of respect owed to
one's humanity. Even if the desire to be esteemed and to enjoy oneself as the
cause of the pleasure of fellow humans animates many of our actions, it cannot
become a force of freedom as long as it depends upon being seen as an absolute
special genre of being, elevated out of nature by virtue of one's rationality,
consciousness, unconditioned will, or anything else. The remedy for the affect
of ambitio or typical gloria involves the indissociability of humanity from the
rest of nature. Paradoxically perhaps, my contention is that the self-love and
the production of collective power and pleasure at which the desire for
recognition aims require a non-humanist theory of agency and desire.
Spinoza's distance from humanism is probably best captured by his remarks
in the preface to part III of the Ethics, dedicated to an account of the "origin
and nature of the affects." He distinguishes his theory from those who treat
"man" as though he is "outside Nature," as if the human realm is a "dominion
within a dominion ... that disturbs, rather than follows, the order of Nature."
What has been called his "anti-humanism," of course, is not an opposition to
human happiness or freedom, which is no less the preoccupation of his
philosophy, but a rejection of the idea that there are special laws that belong
to human existence alone, in any of its manifestations. The laws and powers
that determine human existence are no different from the laws and powers that
determine and express nature as a whole. Thus, Spinoza affirms that "the way of
understanding the nature of anything, of whatever kind, must.., be the same,
namely, through the universal rules of Nature." Since one learns about all
natural phenomena according to the same method, he ends the preface to part
III with the famous remark, "I shall consider human actions and appetites just
as if it were a question of lines, planes, and bodies." 6 Thus his study of emotions
or affects, just like his study of minds and bodies, applies to any and all natural
beings, "all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate"
(Ipl3s).
Human happiness, in short, rests upon ceasing to see ourselves as special,
unique, or exceptional with regard to the tendencies and character of natural
existence. In contrast to the Hegelian tradition and the progressive spiritualiza-
tion and socialization of the natural world, freedom and happiness on Spinoza's
model entail becoming as attentive as possible to one's particular being as a tiny
part of nature whose character one both constitutes and shares. This general
view motivates his well-known critique of free will and subjective interiority
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begun in the appendix to Part I of the Ethics. I would like to suggest that what
has been called Spinoza's anti-humanism is motivated precisely by a desire to
mitigate misanthropy. Throughout his writings, Spinoza notes that philoso-
phers and moralists tend to deride and ridicule human nature in the face of
violence and folly. Alternatively, they create utopian political theories that
ultimately serve the same function-they mock humans as they really are by
imagining them as one would prefer them to be (Spinoza 2000, 33). He aims, in
contrast, to understand human behavior and tragedy just as one would study
the properties and turbulent dynamics of the atmosphere.
As I interpret him, fully philanthropic motivations animate what some have
decried as Spinoza's dispassionate inhumanity (for example, Alqui6 1981;
Nussbaum 2001). Spinoza's polemic against privileging human experience and
uniqueness is meant to enable a more genuine self-affirmation and under-
standing. One can love oneself and other similar beings only by getting over
oneself, or relinquishing a cherished image of humanity and personhood. At
the end of Ethics II, for example, Spinoza notes that his argument against the
autonomy of the human will "contributes to social life, insofar as it teaches us
to hate no one, to disesteem no one, to mock no one, to be angry at no one, to
envy no one" (p49s). Likewise, in Part V, Spinoza affirms that if we understand
"that men, like other things, act from the necessity of nature," then we will not
be governed by our hatred of them (pl0s). The refusal to elevate humans out of
nature, according them a special status by virtue of their rationality, interiority,
or freedom of will, allows us to respond differently to the many destructive
things that people do. The affective therapy of the Ethics aims to enable us to
act based on joy and understanding, rather than fear, anxiety, hatred, envy, or
pain. By understanding ourselves as natural beings subject to the determina-
tions of our environment and constituent relationships, like any other thing in
nature, we may also be able to hate ourselves less for our weaknesses or failures.
Likewise, the acknowledgment that one's good fortune may just be a fortuitous
arrangement of forces may render one less prone to take solace in critical
distance from human folly. Hopefully, the understanding of the causal unity of
nature can prompt uIs to grasp our vulnerability to the affects and activities
of proximate beings, and thus spur us to action rather than the typical
philosophical stances of contemplation or condemnation.
In a similar vein, in an interview, Grosz distinguishes herself from Judith
Butler, who has probably undertaken one of the most profound radicalizations
of social construction, thoroughly denaturalizing any notion of sex or gender.
Grosz notes that "denaturalizing is important. But it is not my project. We
have, by now, been denaturalized as much as we need to be. What I'm much
more interested in [is a] sort of renaturalizing that has been taken away,
redynamizing a certain kind of nature" (Found Objects Collective 2007, 5). It
is this effort to infuse our human perceptions, experiences, and concepts with
an appreciation of their production within and as an a-centric force field of
powers and counter-powers indifferent to human flourishing that Spinoza and
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Grosz share. It is my suggestion that the project of renaturalization comprises an
alternative response to the "crippling self-hatred" that is the object of a politics
of recognition. Rather than seeking the affirmation of one's humanity by other
social subjects, or insisting upon an affirming self-representation within the
social imaginary, one might strive to know oneself and others as singular
instantiations of the infinite power of nature.
What would it mean politically, however, to affirm one's natural rather than
human being? What kind of political practice follows from the renaturalization
of humanity? One of the virtues of the politics of recognition is its insistence
that we become who we are only by virtue of others (intersubjectively).
Moreover, it contends that justice issues from a complex social dynamic that
includes a robust affective dimension in excess of individual psychologies. As I
interpret Spinoza, self-knowledge and the appreciation of one's power as
immanent to nature are likewise collective accomplishments. A Spinozan
politics necessarily entails the collaboration of others, but it is important to
consider those others to include more than human beings, and to consider the
causes and effects of our collective interaction in excess of consciousness or
intersubjectivity. Although Spinoza certainly privileges human interaction-
as he affirms that "to man ... there is nothing more useful than man"-the
power to think and act depends upon many other beings, human and non-
human. Broadening one's frame of reference, apprehending political power and
individual agency as something that involves more than social relations, might
mitigate many sad passions that animate a culture of justice as retribution,
recrimination, and reparation. Depriving humanity of its special status as part
of a project of loving and knowing ourselves and the non-human beings
on whom we depend is arguably of increasing importance in an epoch that
threatens environmental catastrophe. I have yet to make any suggestions,
however, about what kind of political practices and institutions a politics
of imperceptibility might entail. I will conclude with some thoughts toward
that end.
A POLITICS OF IMPERCEPTIBILITY
The politics of imperceptibility, as I understand Grosz, serves as a critique of
thinking exclusively in terms of human representations, while it proposes
a project of an emancipatory renaturalization through an appreciation of
material forces that are indifferent to human conceptualizations even as they
comprise them. As Grosz is surely aware, Spinoza offers her project one of the
most rigorous and uncompromising critiques of human transcendence.
Spinoza's philanthropic non-humanism likewise serves as a kind of foundation
for the Deleuzian resistance to philosophies and politics that privilege
representation and identification. When Deleuze and Guattari invite us to
consider becoming-imperceptible, they are not advocating a retreat from
perception absolutely, as if that were possible. Perception in itself is not
Hasana Sharp 95
necessarily problematic, and it is clear in Spinoza's philosophy that perception
names something that far exceeds our consciousness. For example, Spinoza
contends that "nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the
mind" that is an idea of that body (E lIlp2), and yet "the human mind does not
know the human body" (E I1pl9s), and usually only marvels at what it can do
(E Illp2s). For Spinoza, perception is something that happens in nature rather
than being a uniquely human phenomenon. In fact, human knowledge and
imagination depend upon nature's power to perceive the events, activities, and
passions that follow necessarily from modal existence, while individual
thinking powers have only very imperfect access to the encounters that affect
their own bodies. Deleuze and Guattari seem to target not the perceptive power
of nature itself, but rather the dominant regime of perception, the social
imaginary that filters, contours, and categorizes beings into intelligible entities.
Their affirmation of becoming-imperceptible suggests that the hegemonic
socio-symbolic order always needs to be resisted and challenged, lest we lose
access to the flows and relationships that support or inhibit our actions and
passions.
Children and the insane largely figure as Deleuze's and Guattari's examples
of becoming-animal on the way to becoming-imperceptible. The exemplary
children do not perceive the world as cut up into atomistic parts. Rather, on
their account, the children apprehend assemblages of proximate beings
together producing effects, as when little Hans notices the horse-omnibus-
street. Those who cease to operate in terms of the hegemonic socio-symbolic
order, who fail to use names appropriately, or who begin to imitate the affects of
beasts or things other than human exhibit an affirmation of nature as replete
with possibilities for relationships and becomings other than those prescribed
by the dominant order. They do not become imperceptible absolutely; they are
not in principle inaccessible to other bodies and minds. Rather, they fail to
conform to the dominant social imaginary and travel a less manifest path,
among the infinitely many, that comprise nature. If the examples in A
Thousand Plateaus, however, are largely children, werewolves, and socially
defined madmen, how does this translate into a politics of imperceptibility?
Moreover, what is especially feminist or anti-racist about the politics that such
meditations inspire?
Grosz's schema offers inspiration and redirection without a great deal of
positive guidance. A politics of imperceptibility, above all, entails consider-
ing the subject in terms of vital forces. In her words, "Rethinking the concept
of the subject in terms of force means profound transformations in all related
concepts-of objects, of the social, of actions and agency" (Grosz 2002, 469).
In her recent writings, Grosz openly promotes an increasingly "abstract"
feminist theory, one that involves an overhaul of the most fundamental
ontological categories. Grosz's work has become increasingly autonomous from
specific problems and issues that traditionally preoccupy feminist and anti-
racist thought. For example, it does not often treat particular institutions of
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oppression, but rather meditates upon the character of time, space, and force.
Her work has given rise to a style of thinking that is not confined to answering
to the most manifest exigencies in the lives of women or racialized minorities.
Such a style of thinking risks appearing to be non-feminist, or at least detached
from lived experiences of oppression. Yet the circumscription of feminist theory
to women's issues domesticates and restrains feminist thought. It treats feminist
thought as an application of philosophy, rather than as a proper and
comprehensive philosophical effort. Nevertheless, Grosz's intervention into
the debate surrounding the politics of recognition reveals that her creative style
of thinking contains certain political prescriptions.
Beyond what sometimes appears to be a detachment from particular
exigencies in the lives of women, Grosz's thought shares with Spinoza's a kind
of irony. Grosz explicitly advocates greater abstraction in feminist theory, and,
similarly, Spinoza's thought strikes critics as well as admirers as hyper-rational
and distant from life experience. While my treatment of Spinoza engages his
entire corpus as practical philosophy, both Spinoza and Grosz advocate, above
all, a radical transformation of thinking. While both present a picture of na-
ture as a realm of agonistic forces indifferent to human well-being, their very
projects promote and exemplify intellectual efforts that may seem entirely
distinct in character from an arena of competition among bodies struggling to
survive and thrive. While I only begin to develop such a claim in what follows,
Spinoza's "parallelism" of mind and body supports a portrait of ideas themselves
as forces, as desiring powers in nature, striving to prolong and enhance their
existence. 7 The life of ideas is not different in kind from the life of bodies (E
lip7). On such an interpretation, one should understand both Spinoza's and
Grosz's intellectual interventions into the discourses of their day as energetic,
forceful activities that aim both to combat and suppress certain ideas as well
as to enjoin others to form a counter-mode of thinking and being. Moreover,
while agonism belongs to this process, being a force in nature does not entail
only opposition to others. Forces both thrive and suffer by virtue of their
relationships to ambient forces. The arguments contained in their philosophies
represent not only some measure of prescription for alternative ways of
thinking and living, and thus constitute efforts to impose themselves on other
modes of thinking, but they are also lived enactments of those very
alternatives. Their efforts to think differently are evidence that they have
already enjoyed some fortuitous encounters with other minds and bodies and
marshaled the power to know themselves and live in their worlds according to
different norms. One should understand Spinoza's Ethics, a treatise on the
pleasure and power of understanding, as such a product and project of
assembling forces to think, feel, live, and love oneself, like any other thing, as
a part of nature. Grosz's ideas are both nourished and constrained by a history
of suffering and acting among feminist and anti-racist ideas, since these
traditions of thought comprise a milieu of ideal forces in which her ideas exist
and act. Her thought both produces and is produced by this ideal environment,
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and her interventions both instantiate and constitute a transformation
of this force field of ideas (which always has a concomitant life in the realm of
bodies).
While only the actual lived experience of thinking and acting with others
will reveal what such alternative theories might yield, Grosz promotes a politics
of imperceptibility as an alternative to feminine and racialized subjects
beseeching masculine, colonial, or other dominant subjects to meet their
needs, recognize them, and validate them. Rather, her alternative consists in an
effort "to become more mobile, more fluid and transformable." Instead of
an effort to be valued, feminism becomes a "struggle to mobilize and transform
the position of women, the alignment of forces that constitute that 'identity'
and 'position,' that stratification that stabilizes itself as a place and an identity"
(Grosz 2002, 471). Finally, she advocates the politics of imperceptibility as that
which does not belong to anyone, that leaves its "traces and effects"
everywhere, but is known, or perhaps only felt, retrospectively as increased
mobility, as enabling and surprising encounters and energies that make
womanhood or raced subjectivity other than it was. How, then, might
one endeavor to engage in a politics of imperceptibility? For those who are
attracted to her solicitation, how does one galvanize such imperceptible
destabilization?
Like the plateau from which Grosz takes her inspiration, one might wonder
whether becomings-animal and -imperceptible just happen, independent of
any subjective effort, or whether one may undertake such becomings as a
project. Certainly, this critique of the subject does not allow for a teleological
plan to be drawn up and executed according to the transparent wills of human
actors. Yet Grosz does not advocate simply an attunement to becoming-
imperceptible, but precisely a politics of imperceptibility. I would like to suggest
that Spinoza's philosophy might offer a way to consider political practice in
terms of the imperceptible forces that condition and issue from our affective
engagements with human and non-human beings. Thus, one can understand
a politics of imperceptibility as a politics that produces different indices of
effectivity, which will likely give rise to alternative practices, without offering a
distinctive blueprint for political organization. In contrast to a recognitive
measure of justice, political practice might be analyzed and assessed in terms
of the corporeal capacities, energies, and pleasures to which it gives rise.
Concomitantly, the production of ideas through political engagement will not
be examined in terms of their power to engender true representations,
subjective understanding, or transparency among citizens, or between citizens
and the state. Rather, the index of successful mental assemblages will be the
ability of collectivities to produce potent and enabling ideas.
8
As an example, consider Spinoza's frequent counsel for the organization
of large deliberative assemblies. The insistence upon collective deliberation
productive of rationality seems to link Spinoza comfortably to today's neo-
Hegelians. Yet we might understand and pursue this very same practice from
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the orientation of a politics of imperceptibility. In the Theological-Political
Treatise, Spinoza advocates democracy on the basis that a large number of
thinking powers assembled together generate better ideas: "in a democracy
there is less danger of a government behaving unreasonably, for it is practically
impossible for the majority of a single assembly, if it is of some size, to agree on
the same piece of folly" (Spinoza 1998, 178). Even more forcefully, he claims in
the Political Treatise that collective discussion brings into being ideas that could
never emerge from the meditations of a solitary leader, however sage.
[W]hen all decisions are made by a few men who have only
themselves to please, freedom and the common good are lost.
The fact is that men's wits are too obtuse to get straight to the
heart of every question, but by discussing, listening to others,
and debating, their wits are sharpened, and by exploring every
avenue they eventually discover what they are seeking, some-
thing that meets with general approval and that no one had
previously thought of. (Spinoza 2000, 126; my emphasis)
Spinoza advocates deliberation as a productive process generative of ideas
that might best guide a collectivity in accordance with its own power of
perseverance and flourishing. He recommends large assemblies, I would like to
suggest, because ideas, like bodies, need to be connected and their strivings
joined to one another by actual proximity. 9 The forces and energies need to
interact and encounter one another in excess of the particular imaginings,
desires, and volitions of the individuals involved.
Part IV of the Ethics has as its first proposition: "nothing positive which a
false idea has is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is true."
Truth has no added power by virtue of its veracity. A genuine apprehension of
the rationality, worth, and value of one's fellow citizens as they truly are will
not endure, will not have social force, simply by being accurate. In order to
change the pernicious effects of distorted and damaging representations,
therefore, it is not enough to persuade others of their falsity, or to disclose
publicly the truth of one's interiority, if that were possible. Ideas, representa-
tions, and perceptions have power insofar as they condition and flow
from many thinking powers independent of their will. In order for such
ideas to take hold of subjectivities, determine their actions and passions,
bodies and minds must enter into open-ended engagement and undergo what
emerges.
Because true ideas cannot become powerful simply by virtue of being true,
but must mobilize and connect with a great many other similar ideas, many
thinking powers must pool their efforts to bring into being and sustain ideas
that express vitality and flourishing. Ideas, like bodies, are forces. Thus, no
matter how true, they will die without many others to sustain them. The
fragility of any particular idea speaks to the difficulty not only of arriving at
enabling ideas, but of sustaining and strengthening them. In other words, even
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the realm of politics that is most often examined in terms of intersubjectivity,
recognition, and communicative action as the dialogical generation of
rationality can fruitfully be considered a project of power, a theater of pro-
ductive, nourishing, and agonistic forces. Such an effort to think differently
about our practices may not (and perhaps cannot) displace intersubjective
struggles for recognition. Yet it may open up new avenues for practice and new
criteria for effective political activity. Considering subjects in terms of the
forces and energies that condition and flow from them might lead us to revise
what it means to think and live well.
We might take an analogous perspective on the traditional feminist practice
of consciousness-raising. Such a practice might seem to have little place in a
theory that de-privileges consciousness and intersubjectively derived truth.
Indeed, as it is conventionally understood, consciousness-raising coincides very
well with the commitments of a politics of recognition to mitigate self-loathing.
First, as Catharine MacKinnon describes in her classic piece, like the politics of
recognition, consciousness-raising is an inter-subjective practice that engenders
a positive identity-formation. She cites Sheila Rowbotham approvingly, "In
order to discover its own identity as distinct from that of the oppressor, [an
oppressed group] has to become visible to itself" (Rowbotham 1973, 27; cited
in MacKinnon 1989, 84). MacKinnon associates feminist theory generally and
consciousness-raising in particular with striving to become visible to oneself
and others through a process of mutual self-clarification and group identifica-
tion. Group identification engenders solidarity and thereby establishes new
sources of self-esteem. Women are able to find validation in other women who
can recognize their contributions to society as meaningful, necessary, and
world-sUstaining (compare Honneth 1996). The method of discussing women's
day-to-day lived experience reveals patriarchy-a systematic form of "identity
invalidation" for women-to be the source of their feelings of inadequacy
(MacKinnon 1989, 91, 93). The virtues of this feminist technique are pre-
cisely those identified as necessary by the politics of recognition as it is
formulated by Honneth and Taylor. That is, conscioUsness-raising serves to
attenuate self-loathing, produce solidarity and self-esteem, and generate a less
distorted and more accurate apprehension of oneself and other oppressed
women. It is a practice that aims to see through patriarchal social conventions
and Undo the psychic mutilation they have wrought. Thus, it is Unsurprising
that "ft]he analysis that the personal is the political came out of consciousness
raising" (MacKinnon 1989, 95).
Grosz's plea for an impersonal politics of bodies and natural forces would
seem to be utterly alien to something like consciousness-raising; indeed, it is
alien to such a practice as it is traditionally understood. I imagine Grosz would
share many of the suspicions that Wendy Brown articulates with respect to a
project predicated upon disclosing the "'hidden trUth' of women's experience"
(Brown 1995, 42). Indeed, an impersonal politics inspired by Nietzsche would
have little more than contempt for a project of instituting a Unitary female
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experience, armed with Truth against patriarchy, a regime of distorting lies.
Although any feminist politics organized around a pursuit of the truth of
woman's oppression would seem untenable among many of today's feminist and
anti-racist theorists, I would like to suggest that a practice similar to
consciousness-raising could be approached from an impersonal perspective.
An assemblage of feminized beings, or those with a desire to render their
gendered social location less static, might be reimagined and reoriented as a
collective production of powers, linkages, and transformations. Assembling to
think and act with others who desire to live, feel, and experience themselves
otherwise might find a place as an experimental process grounded in little more
than the yearning to generate a counter-power, a new arrangement of corporeal
forces, and alternative sources of pleasure and agency. In contrast to the
endeavor to recognize one another as sharing analogous experiences and
interchangeable relationships to the social structure, and in contrast to an
effort to recognize "who we are," a politics of impersonality might focus on
what we desire (Brown 1995, 75). Following Grosz, Brown, and Spinoza,
impersonal politics can take its point of departure from the desire to enhance
one's pleasure and power through encounters with other bodies. It is an
affective politics that privileges enabling relationships, wherever they may be
found, rather than particular humans or institutions.
As I imagine it, an impersonal politics does not necessarily invalidate
traditional feminist or anti-racist practices of resistance, even as it re-imagines
and approaches them with new criteria of success. From this point of view, one
aims not (only) to be understood or valued by one's fellows, but rather to feel
stronger, to discover affinities with other vital forces, and to be open to
alternative futures. A politics of imperceptibility affirms that human existence
is within and not above nature. We depend upon and affect innumerable
forces, human and non-human. The measure of our agency that depends upon
other's perceptions of us and our self-understandings may be significant, but it
is hardly the totality of our power and freedom. Moreover, intense attention
directed at our need to be seen as who we really are may be self-defeating. As
many note, our identities are constantly being revised, reinterpreted, and
experienced differently in response to new encounters. Likewise, a narrow focus
on our negative experiences and those who have harmed us may foreclose other
sources of power and pleasure. Spinoza advocates an affective therapy in which
we find our agency in as much of natural existence as possible. He emphasizes
that acting effectively and living well is above all a matter of relations of power
and force among singular desires. Although Spinoza himself exhibited little
concern for women, a feminist politics of imperceptibility does not need him
to recognize its validity. A feminist politics of imperceptibility simply
siphons enabling energy and power wherever it happens to find it. It infects
and enjoins whichever beings and forces might aid in the construction of a
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1. The proposal by Cornell and Murphy demonstrates the difficulty Markell indicates. How is
the state to confer recognition upon identities subject to constant revaluation and recreation?
Although they suggest that the state guarantees "the psychic and moral space" necessary for such
self-recreation, they still insist that the state recognize individuals and groups as bearers of
identities, albeit shifting and provisional ones. "Recognition" comes to be an awkward term for
whatever state policies might promote such fluid processes of identification.
2. Both Taylor (1992, 26) and Honneth (1996, 121) insist on an ideal of recognition that
removes distortion.
3. Given that Grosz's Nietzsche is mediated by Deleuze, who finds very similar strains of
thought in Spinoza, it is not a big leap from one to the other. Moreover, the precise language of
acting and being acted upon is closer to Spinoza's, although he more often discusses the body as
what "affects and is affected" by others.
4. Sharp (2005) treats one of the structural means in detail.
5. 1 will proceed to cite Spinoza parenthetically in the body of the paper with the standard
notation, using Edwin Curley's edition and translation (Spinoza 1985). Citations refer to the part
(= Roman numeral), proposition (= p), demonstration (= d), scholium (=s), corollary (= c),
appendix (= app), preface (= pref), and definition (= def).
6. For an analysis of the function of the mathematical examples in the Ethics, see Sharp
(2010).
7. 1 develop this interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine of ideas in Sharp (2007).
8. In the next three paragraphs, I borrow and reframe an account of the ideal assemblage of
collective deliberation from Sharp (2007).
9. Spinoza's advocacy of large deliberative assemblies certainly does not exhaust his political
philosophy, which I treat only selectively throughout this paper, relying more heavily upon the
Ethics. His political philosophy comprises an exceedingly complex treatment of the uneasy
relationship between passions and actions, irrationality and rationality, in the collective body.
Although I find that most interpretations exaggerate the difference between the ethical and
political projects, especially with respect to the putative pessimism Spinoza evinces about the
potential for mass empowerment and collective activity, I select the example of deliberation by
virtue of its proximity to the politics of recognition. As I mention in the introduction, my argument
here is not that Spinoza's political theory is in every way compatible with, or identical to, Grosz's
politics of imperceptibility. Rather, I am making the more modest claim that Grosz's vision can find
resources in Spinoza's philosophy as a whole and that Spinoza's thought fills out her suggestive
remarks about a politics of imperceptibility.
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